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Abstract
Longtermists claim that what we ought to do is mainly determined by
how our actions might affect the very long-run future. A natural objection
to longtermism is that these effects may be nearly impossible to predict—
perhaps so close to impossible that, despite the astronomical importance of
the far future, the expected value of our present options is mainly determined
by short-term considerations. This paper aims to precisify and evaluate (a ver-
sion of) this epistemic objection to longtermism. To that end, I develop two
simple models for comparing “longtermist” and “short-termist” interventions,
incorporating the idea that, as we look further into the future, the effects of
any present intervention become progressively harder to predict. These mod-
els yield mixed conclusions: If we simply aim to maximize expected value,
and don’t mind premising our choices on minuscule probabilities of astronom-
ical payoffs, the case for longtermism looks robust. But on some prima facie
plausible empirical worldviews, the expectational superiority of longtermist
interventions depends heavily on these “Pascalian” probabilities. So the case
for longtermism may depend either on plausible but non-obvious empirical
claims or on a tolerance for Pascalian fanaticism.
1 Introduction
If your aim is to do as much good as possible, where should you focus your time
and resources? What problems should you try to solve, and what opportunities
should you try to exploit? One partial answer to this question claims that you
should focus mainly on improving the very long-run future. Following Greaves and
MacAskill (2019) and Ord (2020), let’s call this view longtermism. The longtermist
thesis represents a radical departure from conventional thinking about how to make
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the world a better place. But it is supported by prima facie compelling arguments,
and has recently begun to receive serious attention from philosophers.1
The case for longtermism starts from the observation that the far future is very
big. A bit more precisely, the far future of human-originating civilization holds
vastly greater potential for value and disvalue than the near future. This is true for
two reasons. The first is duration. On any natural way of drawing the boundary
between the near and far futures (e.g., 1000 or 1 million years from the present), it
is possible that our civilization will persist for a period orders of magnitude longer
than the near future. For instance, even on the extremely conservative assumption
that our civilization must die out when the increasing energy output of the Sun
makes Earth too hot for complex life as we know it, we could still survive some 500
million years.2 Second is spatial extent and resource utilization. If our descendants
eventually undertake a program of interstellar settlement, even at a small fraction of
the speed of light, they could eventually settle a region of the Universe and utilize a
pool of resources vastly greater than we can access today. Both these factors suggest
that the far future has enormous potential for value or disvalue.
But longtermism faces a countervailing challenge: The far future, though very
big, is also unpredictable. And just as the scale of the future increases the further
ahead we look, so our ability to predict the future—and to predict the effects of
our present choices—decreases. The case for longtermism depends not just on the
intrinsic importance of the far future but also on our ability to influence it for the
better. So we might ask (imprecisely for now): Does the importance of humanity’s
future grow faster than our capacity for predictable influence shrinks?3
1Proponents of longtermism include Bostrom (2003, 2013) (who focuses on the long-term value
of reducing existential risks to human civilization), Beckstead (2013a, 2019) (who gives a general
defense of longtermism and explores a range of potential practical implications), Cowen (2018)
(who focuses on the long-term value of economic growth), Greaves and MacAskill (2019) (who,
like Beckstead, defend longtermism generally), and Ord (2020) (who, like Bostrom, focuses mainly
on existential risks).
2This is conservative as an answer to the question, “How long is it possible for human-originating
civilization to survive?” It could of course be very optimistic as an answer to the question, “How
long will human-originating civilization survive?”
3Versions of this epistemic challenge have been noted in academic discussions of longtermism
(e.g. by Greaves and MacAskill (2019)), and are frequently raised in conversation, but have not yet
been extensively explored. For expressions of epistemically-motivated skepticism toward longter-
mism in non-academic sources, see for instance Matthews (2015) and Johnson (2019).
Closely related concerns about the predictability of long-run effects are frequently raised in
discussions of consequentialist ethics—see for instance the recent literature on “cluelessness” (e.g.
Lenman (2000), Burch-Brown (2014), Greaves (2016)). Going back further, there is this passage
from Moore’s Principia: “[I]t is quite certain that our causal knowledge is utterly insufficient
to tell us what different effects will probably result from two different actions, except within a
comparatively short space of time; we can certainly only pretend to calculate the effects of actions
within what may be called an ‘immediate’ future. No one, when he proceeds upon what he considers
a rational consideration of effects, would guide his choice by any forecast that went beyond a few
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There is prima facie reason to be pessimistic about our ability to predict (and
hence predictably influence) the far future. First, the existing empirical literature on
political and economic forecasting finds that human predictors—even well-qualified
experts—often perform very poorly, in some contexts doing little better than chance
(Tetlock, 2005). Second, the limited empirical literature that directly compares
the accuracy of social, economic, or technological forecasts on shorter and longer
timescales consistently confirms the commonsense expectation that forecasting ac-
curacy declines significantly as time horizons increase.4 And if this is true on the
modest timescales to which existing empirical research has access, we should sus-
pect that it is all the more true on scales of centuries or millennia. Third, we know
on theoretical grounds that complex systems can be extremely sensitive to initial
conditions, such that very small changes produce very large differences in later con-
ditions (Lorenz, 1963; Schuster and Just, 2006). If human societies exhibit this sort
of “chaotic” behavior with respect to features that determine the long-term effects
of our actions (to put it very roughly), then attempts to predictably influence the
far future may be insuperably stymied by our inability to measure the present state
of the world with arbitrary precision.5 Fourth and finally, it is hard to find histor-
ical examples of anyone successfully predicting the future—let alone predicting the
centuries at most; and, in general, we consider that we have acted rationally, if we think we have
secured a balance of good within a few years or months or days” (Moore, 1903, §93). This amounts
to a concise statement of the epistemic challenge to longtermism, though of course that was not
Moore’s purpose.
4See for instance Makridakis and Hibon (1979) (in particular Table 10 and discussion on p. 115),
Fye et al. (2013) (who even conclude that “there is statistical evidence that long-term forecasts
have a worse success rate than a random guess” (p. 1227)), and Muehlhauser (2019) (in particular
fn. 17, which reports unpublished data from Tetlock’s Good Judgment Project).
Muehlhauser gives a useful survey of the extant empirical literature on “long-term” forecasting
(drawing heavily on research by Mullins (2018)). For our purposes, though, the forecasts covered
by this survey are better described as “medium-term”—the criterion of inclusion is a time horizon
≥ 10 years. To my knowledge, there is nothing like a data set of truly long-term forecasts (e.g.,
with time horizons greater than a century) from which we could presently draw conclusions about
forecasting accuracy on these timescales. And as Muehlhauser persuasively argues, the conclusions
we can draw from the current literature even about medium-term forecasting accuracy are quite
limited for various reasons—e.g., the forecasts are often imprecise, non-probabilistic, and hard to
assess for difficulty.
5For discussions of extreme sensitivity to initial conditions in social systems, see for instance
Pierson (2000) and Martin et al. (2016). Tetlock also attributes the challenges of long-term forecast-
ing to chaotic behavior in social systems, when he writes: “[T]here is no evidence that geopolitical
or economic forecasters can predict anything ten years out beyond the excruciatingly obvious—
‘there will be conflicts’—and the odd lucky hits that are inevitable whenever lots of forecasters
make lots of forecasts. These limits on predictability are the predictable results of the butterfly
dynamics of nonlinear systems. In my [Expert Political Judgment ] research, the accuracy of expert
predictions declined toward chance five years out” (Tetlock and Gardner, 2015). But Tetlock may
be drawing too pessimistic a conclusion from his own data, which show that the accuracy of expert
predictions declines toward chance, which remaining significantly above chance—for discussion, see
§1.7 of Muehlhauser (2019).
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effects of their present choices—even on the scale of centuries, let alone millennia or
longer.6
If our ability to predict the long-term effects of our present choices is poor enough,
then even if the far future is overwhelmingly important, the main determinants of
what we presently ought to do might lie mainly in the near future. The aim of this
paper is to investigate this epistemic challenge to longtermism. Specifically, I will
identify a version of the challenge that seems especially compelling, precisify that
version of the challenge by means of two simple models, and assess the strength of the
challenge by examining the results of those models for various plausible combinations
of parameter values.
Since my goal is to assess whether the case for longtermism is robust to a par-
ticular kind of objection, I will make some assumptions meant to screen off other
objections. In particular, I assume: (i) a total welfarist consequentialist normative
framework (the prima facie most favorable setting for longtermism), setting aside
axiological and ethical challenges to longtermism that are mostly orthogonal to the
epistemic challenge7; (ii) a precise probabilist epistemic framework (i.e., that the
rational response to uncertainty involves assigning precise probabilities to the pos-
sibilities over which one is uncertain), setting aside for instance the imprecise prob-
abilist worries discussed in Mogensen (forthcoming); and (iii) the decision-theoretic
framework of expected value maximization, setting aside worries arising from risk
aversion or from “anti-fanaticism” considerations of the sort discussed in chapters
6–7 of Beckstead (2013a) (though we will take up the issue of fanaticism in §6.2).
On the other hand, when it comes to empirical questions (e.g., choosing values
for model parameters), I will err toward assumptions unfavorable to longtermism,
in order to test its robustness to the epistemic challenge.
The paper proceeds as follows: In §2, I attempt to state the longtermist thesis
more precisely. In §3, I similarly attempt to precisify the epistemic challenge, and
identify the version of that challenge on which I will focus. In §4, I describe the first
model for comparing longtermist and short-termist interventions. The distinctive
feature of this model is its assumption that humanity will eventually undertake
an indefinite program of interstellar settlement, and hence that in the long run,
growth in the potential value of human-originating civilization is a cubic function,
6There are some arguable counterexamples to this claim—e.g., the founders of family fortunes
who may predict with significantly-better-than-chance accuracy the effects of their present invest-
ments on their heirs many generations in the future. (Thanks to Philip Trammell for this point.)
But on the whole, the history of thinking about the distant future seems more notable for its
failures than for its successes.
7For discussion of these axiological and ethical challenges, see Beckstead (2013a) and Greaves
and MacAskill (2019).
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reflecting our increasing access to resources as we settle more of the Universe. In
§5, by contrast, I consider a simpler model which assumes that humanity remains
Earth-bound and eventually reaches a “steady state” of zero growth. §6 considers
the effect of higher-level uncertainties—both uncertainty about key parameter values
and uncertainty between the two models. §7 takes stock, organizes the conclusions of
the preceding sections, and surveys several other versions of the epistemic challenge
that remain as questions for future research.
2 Sharpening the longtermist thesis
The longtermist thesis is challenging to state precisely.8 But for our purposes, I will
adopt the following admittedly imperfect characterization:
Longtermism In most choice situations (or at least, most of the most important
choice situations) faced by present-day human agents, what one ought to do all
things considered is mainly determined by the possible effects of one’s options
on the far future.
This statement needs a few immediate notes and clarifications. First, it clearly
inherits the vagueness of terms like “most”, “the most important choice situations”,
“present-day”, “mainly”, and “far future”. For the most part, I will not try to say
how these terms should be precisified.9
Second, by “ought to do all things considered”, I mean to indicate the “action-
guiding” sense of ought that tells an agent what to do, full stop, in light of her
epistemic and doxastic situation. What one ought to do in this sense is to choose one
of the available options that an agent in the same situation with one’s own capacities,
but whose deliberations are practically rational and otherwise normatively in good
order relative to those capacities, might choose.10 It is convenient, in stating the
longtermist thesis, to understand this ought as “evidence-relative”/“prospective”
rather than “belief-relative”/“subjective”, but I don’t mean to take any position in
the debate between subjectivists and prospectivists about ought. If one is inclined
to understand the action-guiding ought as subjective, then the longtermist thesis
should simply be understood as applying only to agents whose beliefs are relevantly
well-aligned with their evidence.
8For extended discussion, see Greaves and MacAskill (2019).
9The exception is “far future”, which I will sometimes precisify as “more than 1000 years from
the present”. This gives a rough sense of what longtermists mean by “long-term” or “far future”,
though some longtermists think that what we ought to do is mainly determined by considerations
much more than 1000 years in the future.
10Cf. the “central ought” in Broome (2013), which I take to indicate the same concept.
5
Third, what does it mean to say that what one ought to do is “mainly deter-
mined by” effects on the far future? The best I can do here is to illustrate with an
example: If one always ought to do what maximizes expected welfare, then to say
that what one ought to do is mainly determined by effects on the far future means
something like: For most pairs of options Oj and Ok, the difference between Oj
and Ok in expected near-future welfare is less than the difference between Oj and
Ok in expected far-future welfare. Longtermism, however, cannot be identified with
the thesis that differences in expected welfare lie mainly in the far future, since it
might be that what we ought to do is not always the thing that maximizes expected
welfare. How the expression “mainly determined by” should be interpreted in the
context of non-consequentialist normative theories and non-expectational decision
theories, I will leave for the reader to infer by analogy.
3 Sharpening the epistemic challenge
The epistemic challenge to longtermism emphasizes the difficulty of predicting the
far future. But to understand the challenge, we must specify more precisely the
kind of predictions we’re interested in. After all, some predictions about the far
future are relatively easy. For instance, I can confidently predict that, a billion
years from now, the observable universe will contain more than 100 and fewer than
10100 stars. (And this prediction is quite precise, since (100, 10100) comprises only
an infinitesimal fraction of the natural numbers!)
But our ability to make predictions like these doesn’t have much bearing on
the case for longtermism. For roughly the same reason that it is relatively easy to
predict, the number of stars in the observable universe is very difficult to affect.
And what we need, for practical purposes, is the ability to predictably affect the
world by doing one thing rather than another. That is, we need the ability to make
practical predictions—predictions that, if I choose Oj, the world will be different in
some particular way than it would have been if I had chosen Ok.
Even long-term practical predictions are sometimes easy. For instance, if I shine
a laser pointer into the sky, I can predict with reasonable confidence that a billion
years from now, some photons will be whizzing in a certain direction through a
certain region of very distant space, that would not have been there if I had pointed
the laser pointer in a different direction. I can even predict what the wavelength of
those photos will be, and that it would have been different if I had used my green
instead of my red laser pointer.
But our ability to make predictions like these isn’t terribly heartening either,
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since photons whizzing through one region or another of empty space is not (pre-
sumably) a feature of the world that matters. What we really want is the ability to
make long-term evaluative practical predictions : predictions about the effects of our
present choices on evaluatively significant features of the far future. The epistemic
challenge to longtermism claims that our ability to make this sort of prediction is
so limited that, even if we concede the astronomical importance of the far future,
the longtermist thesis still comes out false.
A bit more precisely:
The Pessimistic Thesis Let S be an “evaluatively significant” state of the world—
a state such that the expected value of being in state S at a given time is
significantly greater (or less) than the expected value of being in state ¬S.
Let St be the proposition that the world is in state S at time t. And let O1
and O2 be any pair of alternative options faced by a present-day human agent.
For any such S and O1/O2, |Pr(St|O1)− Pr(St|O2)| decreases as t increases,
and decreases quickly enough that most of the difference in expected value
between O1 and O2 lies in the near future.
The Pessimistic Thesis could be true in several importantly distinct ways, which
we will briefly survey in the concluding section. But our main focus will be in one
particular line of reasoning that leads to the Pessimistic Thesis.
Weak Attractors Let S be any of the states that seem like promising objectives for
longtermist interventions: e.g., the continued existence of the human species,
the existence of just or rational political institutions, an enlargement of our
“moral circle”, a high growth rate in per capita consumption, etc. Conceding
for the sake of argument that S has significantly greater expected value than
its complement, and that we can substantially increase its probability over
the medium term, interventions that have S as their objective nevertheless
generate very little expected value in the far future, because our influence
“fades out” over time: Even if we can substantially increase the probability
that the world is in state S, say, 100 years from now, this will not substantially
increase the probability that the world is in state S (or any other desirable
state) a million or a billion years from now. That is, for any alternatives O1
and O2 facing present-day agents, |Pr(St|O1)− Pr(St|O2)| may be significant
for small values of t, but thereafter decreases quickly enough that attempts to
influence S generate very little far future expected value.
Weak Attractors suggests that the same astronomical timescales that drive the
importance of longtermist aims also drive their intractability : As we look further
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into the future, the importance of our civilization being in one state or another
may increase (and may become extremely large), but our capacity to predictably
influence its state will decrease. The case for longtermism may then depend on which
of these effects is dominant over particular timescales. The next three sections will
investigate this question.11
4 The cubic growth model
In this section and the next, I set out two models for the expected value of longter-
mist interventions. Both models incorporate the idea that we can influence the
probabilities of alternative states of the world less at more remote times, as sug-
gested by Weak Attractors. They thereby allow us to evaluate Weak Attractors as a
skeptical challenge to longtermism by quantifying this long-term “fade-out” of our
capacity for predictable influence and seeing what it does to the expected value of
longtermist interventions.
There are some precedents for this sort of modeling exercise—in particular, mod-
els in a similar spirit to mine are sketched in the appendix of Ng (2016), Appendix
E of Ord (2020), and Sittler (ms). The most important contrast between these
models and mine is that Ng, Ord, and Sittler are primarily interested in general
analytical insights (concerning, e.g., whether a reduction in existential risk should
increase or decrease our willingness to pay for further reductions), rather than nu-
merical estimation of the expected value of longtermist interventions. Compared to
their models, therefore, the models I develop below will sacrifice some mathematical
11It is not obvious that what I am calling the “epistemic challenge” to longtermism (including
Weak Attractors and other variants of the challenge to be discussed in §7) is genuinely epistemic.
The challenge asserts, in essence, that we cannot identify interventions that reliably (with sig-
nificant net probability) influence the far future in high-value ways. This could be true in two
different ways: (1) There simply are no such interventions: Even with perfect information about
the present state of the world and unlimited reasoning abilities, there would be nothing we could
do to influence the far future in important ways. (2) Although such interventions exist, we lack
the epistemic capacity to identify them. Perhaps with perfect information about the present state
of the world and unlimited reasoning abilities, for instance, I could have a large positive influence
on the far future by writing an optimific book containing (i) a list of precise instructions for key
individuals and institutions that, when implemented, would put human civilization on a very good
long-term trajectory, along with (ii) several revolutionary mathematical theorems and surprising-
but-accurate empirical predictions, impressive enough to convince those key actors to take my
advice. But given my epistemic limitations, I am unable to identify the sequence of words that
would compose such a book.
In situation (1), the problem for longtermism is a “control deficit”. In situation (2), the problem
is an “epistemic deficit”. It seems somewhat more plausible to me that we are in situation (2). But
if we are in either situation, it seems to matter very little (at least for our purposes in this paper)
which situation we are in. So I will henceforth ignore the distinction and continue to describe the
challenge to longtermism as “epistemic”.
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elegance and simplicity for empirical realism and detail.
The “cubic growth model” described in this section assumes that our civilization
eventually undertakes a program of interstellar expansion, while the “steady state
model” in the next section assumes that we remain Earth-bound. In §4.1, I introduce
and motivate the cubic growth model. §4.2 fills in values for its various parameters,
with the exception of the crucial parameter that determines how fast our capacity
for predictable influence deteriorates. §4.3 presents and discusses the results of the
model for a range of values of that crucial parameter.
4.1 Introducing the model
I assume that an agent is faced with a choice between two options, B and L. B is
a short-termist “benchmark” intervention whose expected value lies mainly in the
near future. L is a longtermist intervention that aims to positively influence the far
future. In explaining and applying the model, it will be useful to have a working
example on which to focus. In the working example, let’s suppose that the agent
works for a philanthropic organization with a broad remit, and is choosing between
two ways of granting $1 million. B would spend the $1 million on direct cash
transfers to people in extreme poverty, through an organization like GiveDirectly.
L would spend the $1 million on mitigating existential risks to human civilization,
say by supporting research on pandemic risks from novel pathogens.12
The short-termist benchmark B, I will assume, has an expected value that is
specified exogenously to the model. In the working example, where B is $1 million
in direct cash transfers, EV(B) might be estimated by a standard cost-effectiveness
evaluation of the sort produced by charity evaluators like GiveWell. For purposes
of the example, I will assume that EV(B) is 3000 QALYs. This number is chosen
partly for convenience, but is in line with recent research.13
12Existential risk mitigation is just one of several categories of longtermist intervention. But it
has received the most attention to date, and its potential payoffs are especially easy to quantify.
13GiveWell (2019) estimates that the cost of creating a unit of value equivalent to averting the
death of an individual under age 5 by means of direct cash transfers is $12,298. If we assume
that averting the death of someone younger than 5 has an expected value of 40 QALYs, then this
works out to a cost of $307.45 per QALY-equivalent, which implies that $1 million of direct cash
transfers has an expected value of approximately 3253 QALY-equivalents. (GiveWell’s estimates
seem to represent average cost-effectiveness rather than marginal cost-effectiveness, but given the
minuscule total volume of cash transfers relative to the number of people in extreme poverty, I
assume that these are not very different, and that an additional $1 million in cash transfers would
not significantly change their marginal cost-effectiveness.)
It should be noted that GiveWell do not consider direct cash transfers the most cost-effective
of the range of “short-termist” interventions they evaluate: They rate a range of public health
interventions as more cost-effective, and deworming in particularly as 19.3 times more cost-effective.
But I take cash transfers as the short-termist benchmark for two reasons: (i) My goal here is not
address questions of prioritization among short-termist causes/interventions or among longtermist
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For simplicity, let’s normalize our value scale so that the expected value of the
“status quo” (doing nothing with the $1 million, or burning it, or spending it in
some non-philanthropic way) is 0, and EV(B) is 1. Let’s call a unit of value on this
scale a valon (abbreviated V)—that is, one valon is a unit of value equivalent to
3000 QALYs. Thus, L has greater expected value than B in the working example if
and only if EV(L) > 1 V.
I will assume that L is equivalent to the status quo in the near future—i.e.,
its benefits (if any) lie in the far future. More specifically, L aims to increase the
probability that the world is in some target state S in the far future. In the working
example, where L aims to mitigate existential risk, S can be interpreted as something
like: “The accessible region of the Universe contains an intelligent civilization.”
The model aims to estimate the expected value of L that accrues in the far future.
So we will designate the boundary between the near future and the far future as
t = 0. What distinguishes the “far” future, for our purposes, is our lack of any
fine-grained information that might enable detailed causal models of the effects of
our interventions. When thinking about the far future, the model assumes, we may
be able to predict some general trend lines (e.g., that the spatial extent of human-
originating civilization will increase with time), but cannot predict local fluctuations
around those trend lines (as we can do in the near future, e.g., for economic growth,
crime rates, etc.) or other particular events. In the working example, I will assume
that the boundary between the near and far future is 1000 years from the present
(i.e., in the year 3020). Time in the far future is measured from this boundary, so
for instance t = 6 years corresponds to the year 3026.
Let S0 designate the event of the world being in the target state S at t = 0, and
¬S0 designate its complement. More generally, St is the event of the world being
in state S at time t, and ¬St is its complement. In the working example, where
S is something like “The accessible region of the Universe contains an intelligent
causes/interventions. So I choose to focus on “representative” or “benchmark” interventions of
each kind rather than trying to identify the best interventions in each category. In this spirit,
I take existential risk mitigation as the prototypical or representative longtermist intervention,
though it is far from obvious that it is the most cost-effective longtermist intervention (Beckstead,
2013b). (ii) Public health interventions like deworming plausibly represent “low-hanging fruit”
whose marginal cost-effectiveness will steeply decline once the diseases they aim to control are
well in check, or when national governments assume responsibility for the necessary interventions.
Cash transfers, on the other hand, can be expected to maintain their cost-effectiveness as long
as there are still people in extreme poverty to whom cash can be transferred without too much
leakage. Thus, cash transfers may be more representative of the typical marginal cost-effectiveness
of short-termist interventions over the coming decades.
In any case, even the most optimistic estimates of EV(B) would raise the 3000 QALY figure I
have adopted by at most a couple orders of magnitude, which as we will see does relatively little
to change our qualitative conclusions about the case for longtermism.
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civilization”, S0 means something like “The accessible region of the Universe contains
an intelligent civilization in the year 3020”, which is roughly equivalent to “Humanity
survives the next thousand years.”
We will represent the version of the epistemic challenge on which we are focused
by the presence of what I will call exogenous nullifying events (ENEs). These come
in two flavors:
 Negative ENEs are events in the far future (i.e., after t = 0) that put the
world into state ¬S. In the context of the working example, where S represents
the existence of an intelligent civilization in the accessible universe, a negative
ENE is any existential catastrophe that might befall such a civilization: e.g.,
a self-destructive war, a lethal pathogen or meme, or some cosmic catastrophe
like vacuum decay.
 Positive ENEs are events in the far future that put the world into state
S. In the working example, this is any event that might bring a civilization
into existence in the accessible universe where none existed previously. The
obvious ways this could happen include the evolution of another intelligent
species on Earth or somewhere else in the accessible universe (i.e., somewhere
in our future light cone), or the arrival of another expanding civilization from
outside the accessible universe.
What negative and positive ENEs have in common is that they “nullify” the
intended effect of the longtermist intervention. After the first ENE occurs, it no
longer matters (at least in expectation) whether the world was in state S at t = 0,
since the current state of the world no longer depends on its state at t = 0. If a
negative ENE has occurred, the world will be in state ¬S, regardless of what state
it was in at t = 0. If a positive ENE has occurred, the world will be in state S,
regardless of what state it was in at t = 0. Thus, if the longtermist intervention
L succeeds in making a difference by putting the world in state S at t = 0, this
difference will persist until the first ENE occurs.
Calling ENEs “exogenous” means simply that they are exogenous to the model—
they need not be exogenous to the civilization they affect (e.g., they include events
like self-destructive wars). More precisely, we assume that ENEs are probabilistically
independent of the choice between L and B, from the agent’s perspective.
Along with the presence of ENEs, the second key assumption of the cubic growth
model is that (conditional on survival) human-originating civilization will eventually
begin to settle other star systems, and that this process will (on average over the
long run) proceed at a constant rate. Further, the model assumes that the expected
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value of a civilization in state S at time t is proportionate to its resource endowment
at t, which grows (not necessarily linearly) with the spatial volume it occupies.14
The model is characterized by the following parameters:
1. tf is what I will call the “eschatological bound”: The time after which the
Universe can no longer support intelligent life and beyond which, we will as-
sume, there is no longer any difference in expected value between L and B.
The most natural candidate for an eschatological bound is the heat death of
the Universe, though as we will see, it does not matter very much which of
the various plausible bounds we select.
2. p is the amount by which the longtermist intervention changes the probability
of being in the target state S at t = 0, relative to the short-termist benchmark.
Formally, p = Pr(S0|L)− Pr(S0|B).
3. ve is the difference between states S and ¬S in expected value realized on Earth
per unit time. (As we will see, separating value realized on Earth from value
realized in the rest of the Universe increases the accuracy of the model for
large values of the parameter r introduced below.)
4. vs is the difference in expected value between states S and ¬S per star in the
region of settlement per unit time, excluding value realized on Earth. In the
working example, this is the difference in expected value between the existence
and non-existence of an intelligent civilization in the accessible universe, per
available star per unit time.
5. tl is the time at which interstellar settlement commences, relative to the near
future/far future boundary.
6. s is the speed of interstellar settlement.
7. n is a function that gives the number of stars within a sphere of radius x
centered on Earth, and hence the number of stars that will be available at a
14In assuming a constant rate of spatial expansion, the cubic growth model neglects two effects
that are important over very long timescales: First, the assumption of a constant speed of space
settlement in comoving coordinates (implicit in taking spatial volume as a proxy for resources)
ignores cosmic expansion, which becomes significant when we consider timescales on the order of
billions of years or longer (Armstrong and Sandberg, 2013, pp. 8–9). Second, it ignores the declining
density (even in comoving coordinates) of resources like usable mass and negentropy predicted by
thermodynamics, which becomes significant on even longer timescales. If we were using the model
to make comparisons between longtermist interventions, these considerations would be significant
and would have to be accounted for. But for our purpose of comparing a longtermist with a short-
termist intervention, these effects can be safely ignored: As we will see, if events a billion years or
more in the future make any non-trivial difference to EV(L), then L has already handily defeated
B on the basis of nearer-term considerations.
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given time in the process of space settlement. Since stars (and mass/energy
resources in general) are many orders of magnitude more abundant in our im-
mediate environment than in the Universe as a whole, the early years of space
settlement will be unusually fruitful, and we will be badly misled if we do not
account for this. Since our aim in this paper requires only order-of-magnitude
accuracy, however, I will use a relatively crude density function, character-
ized by just two parameters: dg, the number of stars per unit volume within
130,000 light years of Earth (a sphere that safely encompasses the Milky Way)
and ds, the number of stars per unit volume in the Virgo Supercluster. (I use
the star density of the Virgo Supercluster rather than the accessible universe
as a whole because whether L or B has greater expected value in the model
is almost entirely determined by the “early” period of space settlement—on
the order of tens to hundreds of millions of years—during which we remain
confined to the supercluster.)
8. r is the rate of ENEs, i.e., the expected number of ENEs (positive or negative)
per unit time. For now, we assume that this rate is constant (an assumption
I will defend shortly), though in §6 we will consider the effects of uncertainty
about r, which introduces a form of time-dependence.
We can now state the model itself:
Cubic growth model
EV(L) = p×
∫ tf
t=0
(ve + vsn((t− tl)s))× e−rt dt
...where n is defined as:
n(x) =

0 x ≤ 0
4
3
pix3dg stars 0 ≤ x ≤ 1.3× 105 ly
4
3
pi(x3ds + (1.3× 105)3(dg − ds)) stars x ≥ 1.3× 105 ly
Intuitively, the model can be understood as follows: The goal of L is to put the
world into the target state S in the far future. It does this not by continuously
acting on the world at every future period, but by increasing the probability that
the world “starts off” in state S at the near future/far future boundary, and hoping
that it will remain in that state. L is able to increase the overall probability of the
world being in state S at t = 0 by some amount p. This is then multiplied by the
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expected value of starting off in state S rather than ¬S, which is given by the time
integral of (i) the expected value of being state S rather than ¬S at time t (given
by (ve + vsn((t− tl)s))) multiplied by (ii) the probability that the state of the world
at time t still depends on its state at t = 0 (given by e−rt).
The two most notable features of the model are (1) the cubic growth term vsn((t−
tl)s)) and (2) the assumption of a constant probability of ENEs, which amounts to an
exponential discount on the stream of expected value associated with L. As we will
see, plausible values of r yield discount rates that are quite small relative to the rates
typically used in economic models. Nevertheless, the combination of polynomial
growth and any positive exponential discount rate, however small, means that the
discount rate will eventually “win”: After some point, the integrand of EV(L) will
go monotonically to zero, and will do so quickly enough that EV(L) is guaranteed
to be finite even without the presence of the eschatological bound. Thus, for any ε,
there is some time t such that the total expected value of L at all times after t is
less than ε.15,16
The cubic growth model involves several significant simplifications. I will discuss
three of them here, and give a more complete accounting in the appendix. First is the
relatively crude approximation of the rate at which our resource endowment grows
as we expand into the cosmos. For our purposes (viz., comparing a short-termist
and a longtermist intervention, rather than making comparisons among longtermist
15To illustrate both the significance and the limitations of these observations, consider an analogy.
Why, if we accept longtermism, should we not accept “ultra-longtermism”, which holds that what
we ought to do is mainly determined by the potential consequences of our actions more than (say)
Graham’s Number years in the future? One apparently very good reason is proton decay : It is
widely believed (though not yet confirmed) that protons eventually decay into lighter particles,
with a half-life on the order of 1030 years or longer (Langacker, 1981). If proton decay occurs, we
might think of it as imposing a sort of exponential discount rate on our projects, since the resources
with which we might eventually reap the rewards of those projects are literally evaporating at an
exponential rate. But if protons have a half life of 1030 years, then the implied annual discount
rate is approximately − ln(0.5)1030 ≈ 7 × 10−29. This discount rate is bound to eventually overwhelm
any polynomial rate of growth, and therefore provides a sufficient (though probably not necessary)
reason why most of our practical concern should be kept within some finite temporal limit. At
the same time, it illustrates that a small enough exponential discount rate can still be completely
irrelevant to the “moderate” longtermist thesis we are considering here.
16The assumption of merely-polynomial growth may seem revisionary relative to the assumption
of exponential growth that is standard in economic models. But we are here concerned with growth
in value (understood as total welfare), whereas exponential growth in standard economic models is
growth in consumption. Given the standard assumption of an isoelastic function from consumption
to welfare/utility with η > 1, individual per-period welfare is bounded above, and so in the long
run—even if we assume endless exponential growth in per capita consumption—growth in total
per-period welfare converges to the rate of population growth. This is complicated by the fact that
η can reflect several different things: diminishing marginal contributions of consumption to welfare,
individual risk-aversion with respect to welfare, social aversion to inequality, or any combination
of these factors. Nevertheless, the assumption that individual welfare is bounded above—at least
as a function of consumption—is not particularly revisionary.
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interventions), it is the early years of space settlement that are crucial. So I have
tried to capture the two most important inhomogeneities in the growth of our re-
source endowment during those early years: the fact that Earth is settled to begin
with, and the relative abundance of stars in the Milky Way. Still, the function n
short-changes the case for longtermism more than a little, since stars are still more
abundant within (say) 100 light years of Earth than within 130,000 light years. This
is partly offset, however, by the model’s generous assumption that once a star is set-
tled, it immediately begins producing value at its “mature” rate. It is plausible that,
especially in the early years of space settlement, there will be a “ramp-up period”
or learning curve that prevents us from immediately converting our abundant local
resource endowment into value.
A second important simplification is the assumption that the longtermist inter-
vention L only aims to affect one feature of the far future, viz., whether we are in
state S or state ¬S. Of course, in the real world, actions can affect the world in
multiple ways. Research on AI value alignment, for instance, might simultaneously
increase the probability that our civilization survives the next 1000 years and in-
crease the probability, conditional on survival, that the denizens of our civilization
1000 years from now have high rather than low average welfare. I adopt the stylized
assumption of a single, binary objective mainly for simplicity and tractability. But
it also seems plausible that, in most cases, there will be order-of-magnitude differ-
ences between the increments of expected value generated by the various objectives
of a given longtermist intervention, in which case we can safely focus on the most
important objective without much loss of accuracy.
A third important simplification is treating r as time-independent. In the context
of the working example, for instance, it is widely believed that we live in a “time
of perils” (Sagan, 1994) and that the likelihood of existential catastrophes (i.e.,
negative ENEs) is likely to decline over time, especially as we begin settling the
stars and so hedge our bets against the sort of local catastrophes that might befall a
single planet or star system (like asteroid impacts or climate change). In §6, we will
consider the effects of uncertainty about r, which introduces a kind of effective time-
dependence: If we know that ENEs occur with a fixed chance in any given period
but are unsure what that chance is, then the overall probability that the first ENE
occurs in period t decreases as a function of t, since the assumption that no ENE
has occurred before t favors hypotheses on which the per-period chance is small.
But uncertainty over time-independent values of r is of course distinct in principle
from genuine time-dependency, and cannot substitute for or approximate all of the
ways in which r could plausibly be time-dependent (e.g., it cannot replicate a sharp
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drop in the value of r in the years immediately after we start settling the stars).
I make the assumption of time-independence, again, partly for simplicity and
tractability. But it is also in keeping with the principle of making the empirical as-
sumptions that are least favorable to longtermism, within reason. While the “time
of perils” hypothesis is plausible, it is of course still highly speculative. And while
it is harder to imagine existential catastrophes that might wipe out an interstel-
lar civilization than those that might wipe out a planetary civilization, it is worth
bearing in mind that none of the existential risks that most concern us today (cli-
mate change, nuclear war, engineered pathogens, artificial superintelligence...) were
imaginable to anyone living even 200 years ago. So the difficulty of imagining ex-
istential risks to far-future civilization is only weak evidence that such risks will be
minimal (and the apparent pattern of increasing existential risk in the 20th and 21st
centuries gives at least some prima facie evidence that the future will be more dan-
gerous than the present). Finally, remember that the cubic growth model applies
only to the far future, taken to begin 1000 years from the present. Even if we do
live in a time of perils, it is plausible that this period will have largely subsided by
3020 (assuming we survive that long in the first place) and that, at least from our
present epistemic vantage point, the annual probability of existential catastrophe is
largely time-independent thereafter.
4.2 Filling in parameter values
In the cubic growth model, r is both the most consequential parameter and the
hardest to estimate. So my approach will be to decide on values for the other
parameters and then, using those values, compute EV(L) for a wide range of possible
values of r.
tf is the easiest parameter to estimate, because it turns out not to matter very
much (though it becomes more significant in the steady state model below, for which
we will need a revised estimate). I will use the most conservative reasonable basis
for tf , viz., the time at which the last stars are expected to burn out. This gives us
tf = 10
14 years (Adams and Laughlin, 1997). But the value of tf is comparatively
unimportant because if L is still yielding any significant expected value after roughly
t = 108 years, then it has already accumulated vastly greater expected value than
B. That is, bounding the integral anywhere after t = 108 years will almost never
affect whether EV(L) > EV(B).
p is more consequential, and harder to estimate. I will make a lower-bound
estimate based on the details of our working example, that is almost certainly
far too pessimistic, but nevertheless informative. The estimate proceeds in two
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stages: First, how much could humanity as a whole change the probability of S0
(i.e., roughly, the probability that we survive the next thousand years), relative to
the status quo, if we committed all our collective time and resources solely to this
objective for the next thousand years? “One percent” seems like a very safe lower
bound here (remembering that we are dealing with epistemic probabilities rather
than objective chances). Now, if we assume that each unit of time and resources
makes the same marginal contribution to increasing the probability of S0, we can
calculate p simply by computing the fraction of humanity’s resources over the next
thousand years that can be bought for $1 million, and multiplying it by 0.01. This
yields p ≈ 2× 10−14.17
This is an extremely conservative lower bound. First, resources committed to any
objective tend to have diminishing marginal impact. And the status quo seems to
represent a very early margin with respect to any longtermist objective—that is, we
should expect only a small fraction of humanity’s resources over the next thousand
years to be committed to any given longtermist objective like mitigating existential
risks. So we should expect that the marginal impact of a given unit of resources is
greater than the average impact of that same unit would be on the assumption that
we invest all our resources in that objective. Second, resources committed at earlier
time should have greater impact, all else being equal. (If nothing else, this is true
17Assume a working population of 5 billion, working 40 hours a week, 50 weeks a year. This
yields a total of 40×50×5×109 = 1013 work hours per year, or 1016 work hours over the next 1000
years. Assume that $1 million is enough to hire ten people for a year (or two people for five years,
etc), for a total of 20,000 work hours. This amounts to 2 × 10−12 (two trillionths) of humanity’s
total labor supply over the next thousand years, and yields p = 2× 10−14.
For comparison, Millett and Snyder-Beattie (2017) estimate that the risk of human extinction in
the next century from accidental or intentional misuse of biotechnology is between 1.6× 10−6 and
2×10−2, and that $250 billion in biosecurity spending could reduce this risk by at least 1%. Again
assuming that spending on existential risk mitigation has either constant or diminishing marginal
returns, and ignoring the difference between the 100 and 1000 year timeframes (which means
ignoring both potential benefits of risk reduction in the next century on risk in later centuries,
but also the possibility that despite averting an existential catastrophe in the next 100 years, we
fail to survive the next 1000 years), this implies p ≥ 6.4 × 10−14 (using the lowest estimate of
extinction risk from biotechnology), though this could increase to as much as p ≥ 8× 10−10 if we
took a higher estimate of status quo risk levels. (Note two points: First, if the risk of extinction
from biotechnology is much below 1% in the next century, then there are probably other, more
pressing existential risks on which our notional philanthropist could more impactfully spend her
$1 million. Second, the numbers from Millett and Snyder-Beattie are model-based estimates of
objective risk, whereas p is meant to capture a change in the evidential probability of extinction.
Given our uncertainties, the evidential probability of extinction from biotechnology is likely to be
orders of magnitude greater than our lower-bound estimate of the objective risk.)
As another point of comparison, Todd (2017) estimates that $100 billion spent on reducing
extinction risk could achieve an absolute risk reduction of 1% (e.g., reducing total risk from 4%
to 3%). Again assuming constant or diminishing marginal returns and ignoring the difference in
timeframes, this implies p ≥ 10−7. None of these numbers should be taken too seriously, but they
indicate the wide range of plausible values for p.
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because resources that might be committed to existential risk mitigation, say, 500
years from now can do nothing to prevent any of the existential catastrophes that
might occur in the next 500 years, while resources committed today are potentially
impactful any time in the next thousand years.) Thus, I think it would be justifiable
to adjust p upward from this lower-bound estimate by a several-order-of-magnitude
“fudge factor”, if we were so inclined. But in the spirit of making things hard for
longtermism, I will stick with p = 2× 10−14.
Estimating vs presents a different puzzle: It is easy to come up with empirically
motivated estimates, but different scenarios compatible with the cubic growth model
yield vastly different estimates of vs. I will highlight two scenarios in particular.
The “Space Opera” scenario In this scenario, the settlement of space takes the
form of human beings (or broadly human-like organisms) living on Earth-like
planets at familiar population densities. In this scenario, we might estimate
that the average star can support 300 million people at a time, living lives
roughly equivalent to present-day happy lives, with a value of one QALY
per year. (The 300 million figure is more than a little arbitrary, and chosen
partly for convenience, but is meant to reflect the fact that not all stars have
particularly Earth-like planets, and those that do may have planets that are
smaller and less hospitable to human or post-human life than Earth. It is
worth remembering that the large majority of stars are red dwarfs.) Since our
unit of value is 3000 QALYs, this means that vs = 10
5 valons per star per
year.
The “Dyson Spheres” scenario In this scenario, space settlement involves high-
efficiency conversion of mass and energy into value-bearing entities. A straight-
forward version of this scenario involves the construction of Dyson spheres or
Matrioshka brains around each settled star, which are then used to power sim-
ulated minds with happy (or otherwise valuable) experiences. Bostrom (2003)
estimates that in this setup, the average star could support the equivalent of
1025 happy human lives at a time—i.e., 1025 QALYs per year. This implies
vs = 3.3¯× 1020 valons per star per year.18
18Bostrom’s estimate is conservative in a number of ways, relative to the assumptions of the
Dyson Sphere scenario. It assumes that we would need to simulate all the computations performed
by a human brain (as opposed to, say, just simulating the cerebral cortex, while simulating the rest
of the brain and the external environment in a much more coarse-grained way, or simulating minds
with a fundamentally different architecture than our own) and that the minds we simulate would
have only the same welfare as the average present-day healthy human being (which, arguably,
is only slightly positive). There may also be other ways of converting mass and energy into
computation that are orders of magnitude more efficient than Matrioshka brains (Sandberg et al.,
2016). But the conservative estimate is enough to illustrate the point.
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For now, I will adopt the more conservative figure, vs = 10
5 valons per star
per year. In §6, we will consider what happens when we incorporate uncertainty
between the Space Opera and Dyson Sphere scenarios in our estimate of vs.
ve in principle presents the same puzzles as vs: The amount of value realized
annually on Earth (or, more broadly, in our Solar System) might be many orders of
magnitude greater in the future than it is today. But still taking conservatism as
our watchword, we will assume that human civilization on Earth simply continues
to generate the same level of value it does today, which we can estimate at 6 billion
QALYs per year, yielding ve = 2× 106 valons per year.19
The parameters dg and ds, which define the function n, are more or less known
quantities: The Milky Way contains approximately 200 billion stars (and the con-
tribution of nearby dwarf galaxies is trivial in comparison), so dg (stars per unit vol-
ume within 130,000 light years of Earth) is approximately 2×10
11
4
3
pi(1.3×105)3 ≈ 2×10
11
9.2×1015 ≈
2.2×10−5 stars per cubic light year. The Virgo Supercluster contains approximately
200 trillion stars, and has a radius of approximately 55 million light years, which
implies ds =
2×1015
4
3
pi(5.5×107)3 ≈ 2.9× 10−9 stars per cubic light year.
The next parameter is s, the long-run average speed of space settlement. This
parameter is reasonably consequential (since it is cubed in the model), but fortu-
nately its range of plausible values is fairly constrained (assuming our descendants
will not find some technological workaround that lets them settle the Universe at su-
perluminal speeds). I will adopt the fairly conservative assumption that s = 0.1c.20
19This estimate sets aside the welfare of non-human animals on Earth, or rather, implicitly
assumes that in the far future, the total welfare of non-human animals on Earth will be roughly
the same whether or not an intelligent civilization exists on Earth. One could argue for either a
net positive or net negative effect of far future human civilization on non-human animal welfare
on Earth. (And, particularly conditional on a “space opera” scenario for space settlement, one
could argue for positive or negative adjustments to vs to account for non-human welfare.) But I
set these considerations aside for simplicity.
20The main constraint on s appears to be the density of the interstellar medium and the con-
sequent risk of high-energy collisions. In terms of the mass requirements of a probe capable of
settling new star systems and the energy needed to accelerate/decelerate that probe, Armstrong
and Sandberg (2013) argue convincingly that speeds well above 0.9c are achievable. On an in-
tergalactic scale, such speeds may be feasible tout court (Armstrong and Sandberg, 2013, p. 9).
But there may be a lower speed limit on intragalactic settlement, given the greater density of
gas and dust particles. The Breakthrough Starshot initiative aims to launch very small probes
toward nearby star systems at ∼ 0.2c, which appears to be feasible given modest levels of shielding
(Hoang et al., 2017). Though larger probes will incur greater risk of collisions, this probably will
not greatly reduce achievable velocities, since probes can be designed to minimize cross-sectional
area, so that collision risk increases only modestly as a function of mass.
Admittedly, s = 0.1c still seems to be less conservative than the other parameter values I have
chosen. It is hard to identify a most-conservative-within-reason value for s, but we could for
instance take the speed of Voyager 1, currently leaving the Solar System at ∼ 0.000057c. But
using such a small value for s would make the cubic growth model essentially identical to the
steady state model (in which interstellar settlement simply never happens; see §5), except for very
small values of r. So a less-than-maximally-conservative value of s is in line with the less-than-
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tl (the time at which we begin interstellar settlement, relative to the near fu-
ture/far future boundary) is hard to estimate on any empirical basis, but fortunately
is not terribly consequential. I will choose tl = 0 (implying, on our interpretation
of the working example, that we begin settling the stars in the year 3020). Other
reasonable guesses would not qualitatively change our results.21
This leaves the parameter that is both most consequential and hardest to es-
timate: r, the combined rate of negative and positive ENEs. What makes r par-
ticularly difficult to estimate? In the context of the working example, r is (to a
good approximation) the sum of three factors, each of which is individually hard to
estimate. First is the rate of negative ENEs, i.e., far future existential catastrophes.
There are plausible, though inconclusive, arguments for thinking that this will be
quite small (and will decline with time): If we survive the next thousand years, this
by itself suggests that the existential threats we face are not extremely severe. And
once we begin settling the stars, our dispersion should make us immune from all or
nearly all natural catastrophes, and provide at least some defense-in-depth against
anthropogenic catastrophes. But while these considerations suggest that the hazard
rate for far future human-originating civilization should be “small”, they don’t tell
us how small—and over the long run, even small hazard rates can be extremely
significant. Moreover, as I argued at the end of §4.1, we should not be too sanguine
about the assumption of low/declining existential risk in the far future.
The second and third components of r come from positive ENEs. To begin with,
there is the possibility that a civilization arising elsewhere will attempt to settle our
region of the Universe and, if we have disappeared, step in to fill the gap left by our
absence. How likely this is per unit time depends on the rate at which intelligent
civilizations arise in the sufficiently nearby part of the Universe (plus some additional
uncertainty about how much of the Universe an average interstellar civilization will
manage to settle, and how quickly). And this is a matter of extreme uncertainty:
According to Sandberg et al. (2018) (who perform a resampling analysis on estimates
of the various parameters in the Drake equation from the recent scientific literature),
plausible estimates for the rate at which intelligent civilizations arise in the Universe
span more than 200 orders of magnitude!
Finally, there is the possibility that, if we go extinct, another intelligent species
and civilization will arise on Earth to take our place. There is considerably less
uncertainty here than with respect to alien civilizations (since we don’t need to
maximally-conservative assumption of the cubic growth model itself that interstellar settlement
will eventually be feasible.
21For instance, if we instead used tl = 500 years, the crucial value of r below which L overtakes
B in expected value would only decrease from ∼ 0.000182 to ∼ 0.000178.
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worry about the early steps on the road to civilization, like abiogenesis). Still,
we have very little data on the transition from typical mammalian intelligence to
human intelligence (and the most important datum we do have—namely, our own
existence—may be contaminated by observer selection effects). In any event, I am
not aware of any research that strongly constrains this component of r.
It is plausible to suppose that the rate of positive ENEs in the working example
(that is, the rate at which “replacements” for human civilization emerge, from either
terrestrial and extraterrestrial sources) is not greater than 10−6 per year. If r is
significantly greater than 10−6 per year, therefore, it will be in virtue of negative
ENEs. With respect to negative ENEs in the working example (i.e., exogenous
existential catastrophes), it seems plausible their rate will not be greater in the far
future than it is today, and that it is today not greater than 10−2 per year.22
Thus we can venture with reasonable confidence that r < 10−2 per year. But r
could plausibly be much smaller than this, if advanced civilizations are extremely
stable and if the evolution of intelligence is sufficiently difficult. I cannot see any
clear reason for ruling out values of r small enough to be negligible over the next
1014 years (say, r = 10−20 per year or less).
Rather than attempting to decide what the value of r should be, therefore, I will
simply report the results of the model for a wide range of possible values, and leave
it for the reader to decide what parts of this range are most plausible. (In §6, we
will consider what happens when we account for our uncertainty about r.)
4.3 The results of the model
We have now specified provisional values for all the model parameters except r.
So we can see what the model tells us for various values of r. The results are
summarized in Table 1. I will mainly leave the discussion of these results for §7, but
a few points are worth noting immediately.
First, the headline result is that EV(L) > EV(B) iff r is less than ∼ 0.000182
(roughly two-in-ten-thousand) per year. This is on the high end of plausible long-
term values of r (or so it seems to me), but within the range of reasonable specula-
tion. Thus, our initial conclusion is mixed: The combination of polynomial growth
22To my knowledge, the most pessimistic estimate of near-term existential risk in the academic
literature belongs to Rees (2003), who gives a 0.5 probability that humanity will not survive the
next century. Assuming a constant hazard rate, this implies an annual risk of roughly 6.9× 10−3.
Sandberg and Bostrom (2008) report an informal survey of 19 participants at a workshop on
catastrophic risks in which the highest estimate for the probability of human extinction by the
year 2100 was also 0.5 (as compared to a median estimate of 0.19). Other estimates, though more
optimistic, generally imply an annual risk of at least 10−4. For a collection of such estimates, see
Tonn and Stiefel (2014, pp. 134–5).
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r EV(L) Horizon∗
0.1 ∼ 4× 10−7 ∼ 214 years
0.01 ∼ 4.11× 10−6 ∼ 3232 years
0.001 ∼ 1.15× 10−3 ∼ 42, 642 years
0.000182 ∼ 1 ∼ 275, 287 years
0.0001 ∼ 11.1 ∼ 526, 998 years
0.00001 ∼ 1.11× 105 ∼ 6 million years
0.000001 ∼ 1.58× 108 ∼ 72 million years
0.0000001 ∼ 5.13× 109 ∼ 821 million years
0.00000001 ∼ 1.46× 1013 ∼ 9.18 billion years
Table 1: The cubic growth model for p = 2 × 10−14, tf = 1014 years, ve = 2 × 106
valons per year, vs = 10
5 valons per star per year, dg = 2.2 × 10−5 stars per
cubic light year, ds = 2.9 × 10−9 stars per cubic light year, s = 0.1c, and tl =
0. [∗] The “horizon” is the time after which the discount rate “wins” and the
integrand of EV(L) is no longer significant—specifically, the point at which t3e−rt
falls (permanently) below 1/t.
Figure 1: Integrand of EV(L) for r = 0.00001 (10−5). Note that the large majority
of expected value comes well before the “horizon” as we have defined it.
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and an exponential discount rate does not automatically sink the case for longter-
mism, but does leave it open to question.
Second, note the “horizon” values in the last column of Table 1. This measures,
in an admittedly crude way, the point at which the discount rate “overwhelms” the
growth rate, so that further contributions to EV(L) are no longer significant. As
Figure 1 illustrates, this estimate is quite generous, marking a point far in the tail
of the integrand of EV(L). It is notable that, even for values of r on which the
longtermist option is expectationally superior, the horizon is not always astronomi-
cally far in the future. The results in Table 1 therefore suggest the possibility that,
although we should be longtermists, we should be longtermists only on the scale of
thousands or millions of years, rather than billions or trillions.
Third, the challenge to longtermism in the cubic growth model comes from a
conspiracy of factors, primarily p, vs, and r, but with r playing in an important
sense the greatest role. EV(L) is linear in p and nearly linear in s (for small enough
values of r). So setting p = 1 would raise EV(L) by nearly 14 orders of magnitude,
and optimistic-but-reasonable values (e.g., the 10−7 implied by Todd (2017)—see
note 17) could still raise EV(L) by six or seven orders of magnitude, enough to make
the case for L over B extremely robust in the model. Replacing the “space opera”
value of vs with the “Dyson spheres” value would have a similarly powerful effect
(increasing EV(L) by more than 15 orders of magnitude, except when combined
with the largest values of r), and more powerful if combined with a commensurate
increase in ve. But, at least in crude quantitative terms, r is even more impactful:
Even using the conservative values for other parameters adopted above, r = 0 would
yield EV(L) ≈ 1057 valons!23 And as shown in Table 1, even the difference between
r = 10−2 and r = 10−8 affects EV(L) by nearly 19 orders of magnitude.
Analytically, while EV(L) is linear in p and nearly linear in vs, it is nearly (in-
verse) quartic in some ranges of r, so that an order-of-magnitude decrease in r
corresponds to a four -order-of-magnitude increase in EV(L). More precisely, there
are different “regimes” in the model corresponding to different intervals in the value
of r. When r is large, EV(L) is driven primarily by the stream of value of Earth,
and so EV(L) grows inversely to r (with an order-of-magnitude decrease in r gen-
erating an order-of-magnitude increase in EV(L)). Once r is small enough for the
polynomially-increasing value of interstellar settlement to become significant, the
relationship becomes inverse quartic. This relationship is interrupted by the transi-
23This particular number should not be taken seriously, since when r = 0, some of the simplifi-
cations in the model become extremely significant—in particular, ignoring cosmic expansion and
overestimating star density outside the Virgo Supercluster. The point is simply that even small
values of r do a lot to limit EV(L).
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tion from the resource-rich Milky Way to the sparse environment of the wider Virgo
Supercluster, but resumes once r is small enough that extra-galactic settlement be-
comes the dominant contributor to EV(L). Finally, for still smaller values of r, the
eschatological bound tf begins to impinge on EV(L), and its growth rate in r slows
again (asymptotically to zero, as r goes to zero).
5 The steady state model
The cubic growth model crucially assumes that human-originating civilization will
eventually embark on a program of interstellar expansion, and so the potential scale
of the future comes not only from its duration but from the astronomical quantity
of resources to which our descendants may have access. The supposition that, if we
survive long enough, we will have both the capability and the motivation to settle
the stars looks like a good bet at the moment.24 But there are of course formidable
barriers to such a project, and any guesses about the motivations and choices of
far future agents are speculative at best. Suppose we assume, then, either that
interstellar settlement will remain permanently infeasible, or that future civilization
will not be motivated to undertake it.
Adopting this hypothesis changes the analysis from the last section in at least
three ways. First, of course, we must remove the cubic growth term vsn(s(t − tl))
from our model. This leaves us with what I will call the steady state model, where
the value of human-originating civilization at a time is constant as long as we remain
in the target state S. Formally, the model is now:
Steady state model
EV(L) = pve
∫ tf
t=0
e−rt dt
Apart from changing the form of the model, the assumption of confinement to
our Solar System should lead us to reassess the values of some model parameters.
In particular, tf must be reduced, since if we never leave the Solar System then
presumably the lifespan of our civilization will be bounded by the habitability of the
Solar System. This suggests a value of tf between 5×108 years (roughly the earliest
point when Earth might become uninhabitable due to increasing solar radiation) and
5 × 109 years (when the Sun exits the main sequence). It seems quite implausible
24With respect to capability, see for instance Armstrong and Sandberg (2013). With respect to
motivation, see for instance Bostrom (2012) on resource acquisition as a convergent instrumental
goal of intelligent agents.
24
r EV(L) Horizon∗
0.1 ∼ 4× 10−7 ∼ 36 years
0.01 ∼ 4× 10−6 ∼ 647 years
0.001 ∼ 4× 10−5 ∼ 9118 years
0.0001 ∼ 4× 10−4 ∼ 116, 671 years
0.00001 ∼ 4× 10−3 ∼ 1.42 million years
0.000001 ∼ 4× 10−2 ∼ 17 million years
0.0000001 ∼ 4× 10−1 ∼ 191 million years
0.00000004 ∼ 1 ∼ 501 million years
0.00000001 ∼3.97 ∼ 2.15 billion years
0 20 n/a
Table 2: The steady state model for p = 2 × 10−14, tf = 5 × 108 years, and ve =
2 × 106 valons per year. The “horizon” is now simply the point at which e−rt falls
permanently below 1/t.
that our civilization could survive for 500 million years, but go extinct by neglecting
to settle any of the then-more-hospitable environments in the Solar System like Mars
or the moons of Jupiter and Saturn. Nevertheless, in the name of conservatism, I
will adopt the smaller figure of tf = 5× 108 years.25
Finally, the steady state model presumably supports larger values of r than
the cubic growth model, if a civilization confined to a single star system is more
vulnerable to existential catastrophes (i.e., in our working example, negative ENEs)
than an interstellar civilization. But since I have not tried to estimate r, I will leave
this as a qualitative observation rather than trying to quantify its significance.
Table 2 gives the results of the steady state model for a range of values of r,
tf = 5× 108 years, and otherwise the same parameter values as in the last section.
On face, these results look very unfavorable for longtermism: EV(L) exceeds EV(B)
only when r <∼ 0.00000004 per year, which looks like quite a demanding threshold
for a single-system civilization at relatively high risk of negative ENEs. It is worth
remembering, however, that we have made very conservative assumptions about p
and, to a lesser extent, ve. EV(L) scales linearly with both these parameters in
the steady state model, so it is easy to see how they affect our conclusions. If we
suppose that p = 10−10 (meaning, in the working example, that $1 million spent on
researching existential risks can buy a one-in-ten-billion reduction in the probability
of near-future existential catastrophe) and ve = 2 × 108 valons per year (meaning
that, in the far future, human-originating civilization will support 100 times as
much value in the Solar System as it does today, through some combination of
25Adopting the larger figure would have almost no effect on the values of EV(L) reported in
Table 2 below, except for r = 0, where it would increase EV(L) by one order of magnitude.
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greater population and greater average welfare), then EV(L) exceeds EV(B) as long
as r <∼ 0.02 per year. And keeping r below that threshold seems eminently feasible,
even for a purely planetary civilization.
6 Parameter uncertainty and model uncertainty
6.1 Incorporating uncertainties
Our conclusions so far look like a mixed bag for longtermism: First, in the cubic
growth model, the longtermist intervention is preferred when the long-run rate of
ENEs is less than approximately two-in-ten-thousand (0.000182) per year. It is
prima facie plausible that the true value of r lies below this threshold, but it is hardly
obvious. Second, in the steady state model, the required threshold is much smaller:
The rate of ENEs must be less than approximately four-in-one-hundred-million per
year. And this threshold is extremely demanding: The annual probability that
another intelligent species evolves on Earth (one source of positive ENEs) plausibly
exceeds this threshold on its own. And on the assumption that humanity remains
permanently Earthbound, it requires a lot of optimism to assume that the long-term
rate of exogenous extinction events (negative ENEs) will not exceed this threshold as
well. So the case for longtermism looks plausible-but-uncertain in the cubic growth
model, and extremely precarious in the steady state model.
But in fact, these would be the wrong conclusions to draw. First, of course, we
have made very conservative assumptions about the other model parameters, and
so the true threshold values of r below which EV(L) exceeds EV(B) in each model
may be much more generous than the results in the last two sections suggest. But
more fundamentally, it is a mistake in the last analysis to think in terms of point es-
timates for model parameters at all, conservative or otherwise. We are substantially
uncertain about the values of several key parameters, and that uncertainty is very
consequential for the expected value of L. We are also uncertain which model to
adopt, and this uncertainty should also be incorporated into our estimate of EV(L).
Once we account for these uncertainties, the picture resolves itself considerably.
The ideal Bayesian approach would be to treat all the model parameters as
random variables rather than point estimates, choose a probability distribution that
represents our uncertainty about each parameter, and compute EV(L) on that basis.
But for our purposes, this approach has significant drawbacks: EV(L) would be
extremely sensitive to the tails of the distributions for parameters like r, s, and vs.
And specifying full distributions for these parameters—in particular, specifying the
size and shape of the tails—would require a great deal of subjective and questionable
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Parameter Confidence level Value Min. EV(L)
(Cubic growth) 10−3 (0.1%) — ∼ 4.12× 10−5 V
r 10−3 (0.1%) 10−6 ENEs/yr ∼ 1.58× 102 V
s 10−2 (1%) 0.8c ∼ 4.47× 10−5
vs 10
−6 (0.0001%) 3.3¯× 1020 (V/yr)/star ∼ 3.83× 106 V
Table 3: Effects of uncertainty re the cubic growth model and the values of key
parameters in that model, considered in isolation. Each row indicates the minimum
value of EV(L) that results from assigning at least the specified level of confidence to
values of the specified parameter at least as favorable to longtermism as the specified
value. Except where otherwise specified, calculations assume 10−3 credence in the
cubic growth model (with remaining credence in the steady state model), r = 10−3
ENEs/yr, and the values for other model parameters specified in §4.2.
guesswork, especially since we have nothing like observed, empirical distributions to
rely on. Even if we aim to adopt distributions that are conservative (i.e., unfavorable
to longtermism), it would be hard to be confident that the tails of our chosen
distributions are genuinely as conservative as we intended.
A simpler and more informative approach, rather than inventing full distribu-
tions for each parameter, is simply to place conservative constraints on one point in
the distribution, and see what this tells us. Specifically, we can place constraints on
our confidence levels : For the parameters about which our uncertainties are most
consequential, we can identify values for which we can say: “Any distribution that
didn’t assign at least X % credence to values at least this favorable to longtermism
would be overconfident.” This amounts to merely placing an upper bound on one
point in the cumulative distribution function for that parameter—a far safer enter-
prise, epistemically, than specifying a whole distribution. But as we will see, this
modest approach is enough to deliver unambiguous qualitative conclusions.
Table 3 describes the results of this exercise. Specifically, I assume that we
should assign at least one-in-a-thousand probability to the cubic growth model (i.e.,
to the hypothesis that our civilization will eventually embark on a long-term pro-
gram of space settlement, assuming we survive the next thousand years); that we
should assign at least one-in-a-thousand probability to r ≤ 10−6 ENEs/yr (i.e., to
the hypothesis that our civilization will eventually be stable enough that the ex-
pected number of extinction or replacement events per year is no more than 10−6,
conditional on surviving the next thousand years and on the cubic growth model);
that we should assign at least one-in-a-hundred probability to s ≥ 0.8c (conditional
on surviving the next thousand years and on the cubic growth model); and that we
should assign at least one-in-a-million probability to values of vs at least as great as
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those suggested by the “Dyson Spheres” scenario in §4.2 (conditional on surviving
the next thousand years and on the cubic growth model). When combined with our
point estimates for other parameters, each of these bounds implies a lower bound
on EV(L).26
Bounding our confidence levels in this way is an unavoidably subjective exercise.
Nevertheless, it seems to me that the bounds I’ve identified are quite conservative
and hard to reasonably dispute. Given our enormous uncertainty about all aspects
of the far future, we should distribute our credence liberally over a wide range of
scenarios, and it is unreasonable for instance to be extremely confident that we will
not choose to settle the stars, or that we will not achieve a significantly higher level
of security and stability than we enjoy today. It seems clear, therefore, that any
credence distribution that didn’t satisfy the confidence bounds described in Table 3
would be overconfident.
Taking each source of uncertainty in isolation yields mixed results, as we see in
Table 3. Small credences in the cubic growth model and in more optimistic values of
s do not by themselves guarantee that EV(L) > EV(B) (given the very conservative
assumptions we have made about other parameter values). But small credences in
small values of r or in “Dyson Spheres” values of vs do have that effect, even when
combined with low credence in the cubic growth model itself.
But when we consider all these uncertainties together, the picture is clearer:
Combining the four confidence bounds in Table 3 guarantees that EV(L) >∼ 1.44×
1010 V.27
Accounting for uncertainty in our estimates of parameter values (even in the very
limited way we have attempted here) will tend to strengthen rather than weaken
the case for longtermism, because the potential upside of longtermist interventions
is so enormous. Hypotheses that tap into that potential can generate astronomical
expected value for longtermist interventions, even if the credence we assign those
hypotheses is very small.
Uncertainty about r is particularly consequential both because, in general, an
order-of-magnitude decrease in r implies a four order-of-magnitude increase in EV(L)
(with the complications described in §4.3) and because the range of uncertainty with
26In the case of vs, we must also assume that its distribution is not supported on negative
values. The possibility that the target state S might have negative value grounds a different
kind of epistemic challenge to longtermism, “Neutral Attractors”, which I discuss briefly in the
concluding section.
27These calculations assume that r, s and vs are either independent conditional on the cu-
bic growth model, or correlated in such a way that values of one parameter more favorable to
longtermism (smaller values of r, larger values of s and vs) predict more favorable values for the
other parameters. It seems natural that there should be at least some of this correlation between
“optimistic” parameter values, which would further increase the expected value of L.
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respect to r is very large. For instance, r = 10−8 implies EV(L) ≈ 1.45 × 1013, so
even very small credence in the combination of the cubic growth model with val-
ues of r at least this small can suffice to ensure that EV(L) > EV(B). And if we
think that both the emergence of intelligent civilizations and catastrophes that could
destroy an advanced, spacefaring civilization are sufficiently rare, we might assign
substantial credence to even smaller values of r.28
A final point about the effects of uncertainty: So far, I have simply assumed a
total utilitarian normative framework. But if we take expectational reasoning to
be the correct response to all forms of uncertainty, normative as well as empirical,
this may be another hypothesis for which a little credence goes a long way. Specif-
ically, if we respond to normative uncertainty by maximizing expected value, and
make intertheoretic comparisons (i.e., normalize the value scales of rival normative
theories) in any way that looks intuitively plausible in small-scale choice situations,
the astronomical quantities of value that aggregative consequentialist theories take
to be at stake in the far future are likely to “swamp” other normative theories in
determining the overall expected value of our options. (For a careful exposition of
this point in the context of population axiology, see Greaves and Ord (2017).) If we
fully embrace this sort of reasoning, we might find that longtermist conclusions are
“robust” to objections from axiology, ethics, and normative theory in general, since
even a very small credence in a normative theory like total utilitarianism is enough
to secure the case for longtermism.29
Distinctions between different kinds of uncertainty may be relevant elsewhere in
our assessment of longtermism—in particular, in deciding how to weigh the pos-
sibility of scenarios like Dyson Spheres that involve large numbers of artificial (or
28It is worth noting that uncertainty about r makes r effectively time-dependent in the cubic
growth and steady state models. What matters in these models is when the first ENE occurs, after
which the state of the world no longer depends on its state at t = 0. This means we are interested,
not in the unconditional probability of an ENE occurring at time t, but in the probability that
an ENE occurs at t conditional on no ENE having occurred sooner. If we know that ENEs come
along at a fixed rate, but don’t know what that rate is, then this conditional probability decreases
with time: Conditioning on no ENE having occurred before time t favors hypotheses on which the
rate of ENEs is low, more strongly for larger values of t. This is just another way of understanding
the fact that, when we are unsure what discount rate to apply to a stream of value, the discount
factor at later times will converge with that implied by the lowest possible discount rate.
An interesting analytical result is that, when a value stream is subject to an uncertain exponential
discount rate, with a continuous probability distribution over possible rates supported at least on
the interval [0, k] for some k ∈ (0, 1], the schedule of expected discount factors is asymptotically
hyperbolic—that is, approximates hyperbolic discounting in the limit (Azfar, 1999).
29It is controversial, however, whether we should reason expectationally in response to normative
uncertainty, even given that this is the right response to empirical uncertainty. For defense of
broadly expectational approaches to normative uncertainty, see Lockhart (2000), Sepielli (2009),
and MacAskill and Ord (forthcoming), among others. For rival views, see Nissan-Rozen (2012),
Gustafsson and Torpman (2014), Weatherson (2014), and Harman (2015), among others.
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otherwise non-human-like) minds.30 If we are uncertain whether or to what de-
gree the sort of “artificial” or “simulated” minds that might exist in a Matrioshka
brain are morally statused, should we simply discount their putative interests by the
probability that those interests carry moral weight? Arguably, our uncertainty here
is a kind of “quasi-empirical” uncertainty: We simply don’t know whether minds
instantiated on computer hardware would have the sort of subjective experiences
we care about. But this may also feel more akin to moral uncertainty, and we may
therefore feel reluctant to simply go by expected value.
6.2 Fanaticism
By the rules of the expected value game, the case for longtermism appears to survive
the epistemic challenge with which we confronted it. But it has prevailed in a
way that should make us slightly uneasy: by appealing to potentially-minuscule
probabilities of astronomical quantities of value.
Many people suspect that expectational reasoning goes wrong, or at least de-
mands too much of us, in situations involving these “Pascalian” probabilities. (See
for instance Bostrom (2009), Monton (2019).) But it has so far proven difficult to
say anything precise or constructive about these worries. For that reason, I will
limit myself to a few brief and imprecise observations.
“Pascalian” choice situations are those in which the choice set selected by risk-
neutral expectational reasoning is determined by minuscule probabilities of extreme
positive or negative outcomes. A natural way to measure the Pascalian-ness of a
choice situation, then, is to ask how easily we can change the choice set of expecta-
tionally best options by ignoring these extreme possibilities. That is, we arrange the
possible payoffs of each option from worst to best, snip the left and right tails of each
prospect (removing the worst-case scenarios up to some probability µ ∈ (0, .5) and
likewise the best-case scenarios up to probability µ), then compute the expectations
of these truncated prospects. We then look for the minimum value of µ by which we
would have to truncate the tails of each prospect in order to change the choice set.31
Designating this minimum value µ∗, we can then measure the “Pascalian-ness” of a
30Thanks to Hilary Greaves for this point.
31We can make this precise in the framework of risk-weighted expected utility theory (Quiggin,
1982; Buchak, 2013), with a risk function of the form:
r(x) =

0 0 ≤ x ≤ µ
x−0.5
1−2µ + 0.5 µ ≤ x ≤ 1− µ
1 1− µ ≤ x ≤ 1
We then choose the option that maximizes u1 +
∑n
i=2 r(Pr(u ≥ ui+1))(ui+1 − ui), where the
possible payoffs u1, ...un are ordered from worst to best.
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choice situation on the unit interval by the formula 1− 2µ∗.32
By this measure, the preceding analysis suggests that the choice between longter-
mist and short-termist interventions could be extremely Pascalian. We have found
that longtermist interventions can have much greater expected value than their
short-termist rivals even when the probability of having any impact at all on the far
future is minuscule (2× 10−14, for a fairly large investment of resources) and when,
conditional on having an impact, most of the expected value of the longtermist inter-
vention is conditioned on further low-probability assumptions (e.g., the prediction
of large-scale interstellar settlement, astronomical values of vs, large values of s,
and—in particular—small values of r). It could turn out that the vast majority of
the expected value of a typical longtermist intervention—and, more importantly, the
component of its expected value that gives it the advantage over its short-termist
competitors—depends on a conjunction of improbable assumptions with joint prob-
ability on the order of (say) 10−18 or less. In this case, by the measure proposed
above, the choice between L and B is extremely Pascalian (1−(2×10−18) or greater).
On the other hand, there is tremendous room for reasonable disagreement about
the relevant probabilities. If you think that, in the working example, p is on the
order of (say) 10−7, and that the assumptions of eventual interstellar settlement,
astronomical values of vs, large values of s, and very small values of r are each more
likely than not, then the amount of tail probability we would have to ignore to prefer
B might be much greater—say, 10−8 or more.
These numbers should not be taken too literally—they are much less robust, I
think, than the expected value estimates themselves, and at any rate, it’s not yet
clear whether we should care that a choice situation is Pascalian in the sense defined
above, or if so, at what threshold of Pascalian-ness we should begin to doubt the
conclusions of expectational reasoning. So the remarks in this section are merely
suggestive. But it seems to me there are reasonable grounds to worry that the case
for longtermism is problematically dependent on a willingness to take expectational
reasoning to a fanatical extreme.33
32This measure is imperfect in that it will classify as highly Pascalian some choice situations
that are not intuitively Pascalian, but where two or more options are just very nearly tied for best.
But the measure is only intended as a rough heuristic, not as something that should play any role
in our normative decision theory.
33In Tarsney (ms), I set out a view that is meant (among other things) to give a principled and
intuitively attractive response to the problem of “Pascalian fanaticism” discussed in this section.
The essence of the view is (i) first-order stochastic dominance as a necessary and sufficient criterion
of rationality combined with (ii) recognition of the high level of “background uncertainty” about the
choiceworthiness of our options that is engendered by attaching normative weight to aggregative
consequentialist considerations. Simplifying the story considerably: Under levels of background
uncertainty that seem warranted at least for total utilitarians, the decision-theoretically mod-
est requirement to reject stochastically dominated options implies that we are generally required
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7 Drawing conclusions
The preceding investigation suggests several broad conclusions:
1. If we accept a total utilitarian (or other aggregative consequentialist) moral
framework, respond to uncertainty by simply maximizing expected objective
value, and therefore do not mind premising our choices on minuscule probabil-
ities of astronomical payoffs, then the case for longtermism seems robust to the
kind of epistemic worry we have considered. While there are plausible point
estimates of the relevant model parameters that favor short-termism, once we
account for uncertainty, it takes only a very small credence in combinations of
parameter values more favorable to longtermism for EV(L) to exceed EV(B).
2. There are, however, prima facie plausible worldviews on which the utilitar-
ian case for longtermism depends very heavily on minuscule probabilities of
astronomical payoffs. To the extent that we are wary of simply maximizing
expected value in the face of such Pascalian probabilities, we are left with a
residual decision-theoretic worry about the case for longtermism.
3. More concretely, the case for longtermism seems to depend to a significant
extent on the possibility of interstellar settlement: It is significantly harder
(though far from impossible) to make that case in the steady state model.
4. The potentially enormous impact that the long-term rate of ENEs has on
the expected value of longtermist interventions has implications for “intra-
longtermist” prioritization: We have strong pro tanto reason to focus on bring-
ing about states such that both they and their complements are highly stable,
since it is these interventions whose effects are likely to persist for a very
to choose options whose local consequences maximize expected objective value when the decision-
relevant probabilities are intermediate, but are often free not to maximize expected objective value
when the balance of expectations is determined by minuscule probabilities of astronomical positive
or negative payoffs. The line between “intermediate” and “minuscule” probabilities depends on
our degree of background uncertainty and on other features of the choice situation, but for total
utilitarians in ordinary choice situations, it is probably no greater than 10−9 (and may be con-
siderably smaller). So, if the stochastic dominance approach is correct, the probabilities we have
considered in this paper—starting with p = 2 × 10−14—are on the threshold, from a utilitarian
point of view: It could turn out, on further analysis, that the utilitarian case for longtermism is on
very firm decision-theoretic footing (requiring no decision-theoretic assumptions beyond first-order
stochastic dominance), but it could also turn out that even though longtermist interventions have
greater expected value than short-termist interventions, they are nevertheless rationally optional.
Resolving this question would require much more precise estimates both of the various probabilities
that determine the expected value of particular longtermist interventions and of the probability
distribution that describes a utilitarian’s rationally warranted background uncertainty about the
amount of value in the Universe.
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long time (and thus to affect our civilization when it is more widespread and
resource-rich). This suggests, in particular, that interventions focused on re-
ducing existential risk may have higher expected value than, say, interventions
aimed at reforming institutions or changing social values: Intuitively, the in-
tended effects of these interventions are relatively easy to undo, or to achieve
at some later date even if we fail to achieve them now. So the long-term rate
of ENEs (i.e., value of r) may be significantly higher for these interventions
than for existential risk mitigation.
5. Finally, there is some reason to think that, while the longtermist conclusion
is ultimately correct, we should be “longtermists” on the scale of thousands
or millions or years, rather than billions or trillions of years. The case for
this conclusion is far from conclusive: If you assign substantial probability to
very low values of r (say, on the order of 10−10 per year or less), then you will
have substantial reason to care about the future billions of years from now.
And it is certainly conceivable that far future civilization might be so stable
that these values are appropriate. But it is clearly an open question just how
stable we should expect far future human-originating civilization to be, and
the answer to this question makes a big difference to how we should distribute
our concern over time.
On the whole, my sense is that the “Weak Attractors” challenge to longtermism
is serious and, in the last analysis, probably has significant practical implications
for optimal utilitarian resource allocation, but is not fatal to the longtermist thesis.
But the models and results in this paper are at best a first approximation, and much
more work is needed to reach that last analysis.
Additionally, there are other potential sources of epistemic resistance to longter-
mism besides Weak Attractors that this paper has not addressed. In particular,
these include:
Neutral Attractors To entertain small values of r, we must assume that the state
S targeted by a longtermist intervention, and its complement ¬S, are both at
least to some extent “attractor” states: Once a system is in state S, or state
¬S, it is unlikely to leave that state any time soon. But to justify significant
values of ve and vs, it must also be the case that the attractors we are able
to target differ significantly in expected value. And it’s not clear that we
can assume this. For instance, perhaps “large interstellar civilization exists
in spatial region X” is an attractor state, but “large interstellar civilization
exists in region X with healthy norms and institutions that generate a high
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level of value” is not. If civilizations tend to “wander” unpredictably between
high-value and low-value states, it could be that despite their astronomical
potential for value, the expected value of large interstellar civilizations is close
to zero. In that case, we can have persistent effects on the far future, but not
effects that matter (in expectation).
Immediate Cluelessness I have focused on the potential long-term decay of our
predictive abilities due to the continuing possibility of unpredictable events
(ENEs). But perhaps I have been too generous about our capacity for “medium-
term” practical prediction, on the scale of hundreds or thousands rather than
millions of years. In other words, perhaps my allegedly lower-bound estimate
of p = 2 × 10−14 was over-optimistic—e.g., because the world is “chaotic” in
such a way that our ability to predict the effects of our interventions even on
a scale of decades is practically zero or, on the other hand, because the world
is deterministic enough that we are already locked into trajectories that are
difficult or impossible to change, even temporarily.
Imprecise probabilist and non-probabilist objections At many points in this
paper, I have relied on the assumption that we can assign precise probabilities
to decision-relevant possibilities, even when we have nothing like observed fre-
quencies on which to base those probabilities. But many are skeptical of this
assumption. There are many other formal and informal frameworks for repre-
senting uncertainty, which generally demand significant modifications to stan-
dard expectational decision theory. Whether the case for longtermism fares
better or worse against epistemic challenges in these alternate frameworks is a
large question which must be addressed framework by framework. But insofar
as, in the precise probabilist framework, the case for longtermism relies to a
significant extent on expectational reasoning about very small probabilities of
very large payoffs, there is some prima facie reason to suspect that things may
be more difficult in other epistemic and decision-theoretic frameworks that are
less welcoming to this kind of reasoning.34
My own sense is that Weak Attractors is the most serious epistemic challenge to
longtermism, but that is little more than a hunch, and these other challenges should
be thought through carefully as well.
Longtermism, if true, is of enormous and revolutionary practical importance. It
therefore deserves careful scrutiny. I hope to have shown, on the one hand, that
34For discussion of a potential challenge to longtermism that arises in the context of imprecise
probabilist epistemology and decision theory, see Mogensen (forthcoming).
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even within the most hospitable normative frameworks (like total utilitarianism)
the case for longtermism is not trivial, but on the other hand, that it has reasonable
prospects of surviving an important and under-explored challenge.
Appendix: Simplifications in the cubic growth model
In this appendix, I catalog some of the very many simplifications involved in the cu-
bic growth model, in the way in which I applied that model to our working example,
and in the approach of hedging between the steady state and cubic growth models
suggested in §6. I briefly explain why, in my view, each of these simplifications is
tolerable for our purposes (viz., for comparing generic longtermist and short-termist
interventions with enough quantitative accuracy to draw broad qualitative conclu-
sions about the case for longtermism). But the list is also meant as a “wish list”
of ways in which more complex expected value models for longtermist interventions
might improve on the relatively simple models I have developed in this paper. I
have tried to list the simplifications in descending order of importance.
Simplification: The analysis in §6 makes no attempt to comprehensively ac-
count for model uncertainty—it considers only two models from an infinite set of
possible models and a probably-very-large set of plausible models.
Rationale: (1) There’s no good way (that I can think of) to randomly sample
or average over the set of all possible/plausible models. (2) Including other models
less optimistic than the cubic growth model is unlikely to change our quantitative
results by more than 1–2 orders of magnitude, and so unlikely to affect our qualita-
tive conclusions, as long we still assign at least ∼ 0.01 probability to models at least
as optimistic as the cubic growth model. Including more optimistic models (e.g.,
with indefinite exponential growth) is only likely to strengthen our qualitative con-
clusions, by making the expectational case for longtermism even more robust under
uncertainty but also exacerbating worries about Pascalian fanaticism (assuming we
assign these greater-than-cubic models low probability).
Simplification: The rate of ENEs, r, is treated as time-independent.
Rationale: (1) The main argument against time-independence is the hypothesis
that anthropogenic extinction risk will decline as we settle more of the Universe,
which is plausible but non-obvious. (2) There’s no clear empirical basis for modeling
the time-dependence of r, so the assumption of constant r is licensed by the principle
of defaulting to a simpler model when additional complexity would require subjective
and poorly-motivated guesswork. (3) This assumption is justified by the practice of
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making assumptions that are conservative with respect to the case for longtermism,
since including time-dependence is likely to favor L over B.
Simplification: The longtermist intervention L has only a single effect, viz.,
increasing the probability that the world is in state S rather than ¬S in the far
future.
Rationale: (1) Accounting for secondary objectives seems unlikely to change
our quantitative results by more than 1–2 orders of magnitude (though this is far
from obvious), and so unlikely to affect our qualitative conclusions. (2) There’s no
clear empirical basis for modeling interactions between multiple long-term effects of
a longtermist intervention.
Simplification: Neither the cubic growth model itself nor the estimate of
EV(B) that we adopted to analyze the working example make any attempt to model
long-term/“flow-through” effects from the short-termist intervention B.
Rationale: (1) There’s no clear empirical basis for modeling these effects. (2)
This simplification is arguably justified by the aim of assessing the longtermist the-
sis rather than assessing particular interventions: If the long-term indirect or flow-
through effects of apparently “short-termist” interventions give them greater ex-
pected value than apparently “longtermist” interventions, this doesn’t refute longter-
mism but just tells us which interventions are best from a longtermist perspective.
Simplification: Welfare per person/per settled star is assumed to be constant
in the far future.
Rationale: Dropping this simplification seems unlikely to change our quantita-
tive results by more than 1–2 orders of magnitude (though this is far from obvious),
and so unlikely to affect our qualitative conclusions.
Simplification: The model ignores effects on the welfare of beings other than
Homo sapiens and our “descendants”.
Rationale: (1) The sign and magnitude of the effects of paradigmatic longter-
mist interventions on the welfare of non-human animals (or their far-future counter-
parts) are very unclear. (2) Dropping this simplification seems unlikely to change
our quantitative results by more than 1–2 orders of magnitude (though this is far
from obvious), and so unlikely to affect our qualitative conclusions.
Simplification: The speed of interstellar settlement, s, is treated as constant
(ignoring, for instance, the possibility of higher speeds for intergalactic rather than
intragalactic settlement).
36
Rationale: (1) The significance of these effects is unclear. (2) This assumption
is justified by the practice of making assumptions that are conservative with respect
to the case for longtermism, provided we choose a value of s that is conservative for
all phases of space settlement.
Simplification: The model assumes that the effect of L, if any, happens at
t = 0 (i.e., it ignores the potential value of L putting/keeping the world in state S
at times before t = 0).
Rationale: (1) Dropping this simplification is unlikely to change our quantita-
tive results by more than 1–2 orders of magnitude (except when combined with very
large values of r), and so unlikely to affect our qualitative conclusions. (2) This sim-
plification is arguably justified by the aim of assessing the longtermist thesis rather
than particular interventions: If the near-term effects of apparently “longtermist”
interventions give them greater expected value than paradigmatic short-termist in-
terventions, this is at best a limited vindication of longtermism.
Simplification: The model uses a crude star density function and, more gener-
ally, a crude approximation of the growth in our resource endowment with spatial
expansion.
Rationale: Dropping this simplification is unlikely to change our quantitative
results by more than 1–2 orders of magnitude, and so unlikely to affect our qualitative
conclusions.
Simplification: The model does not include any “ramp-up period” in value
generation after settling new star systems—it implicitly assumes that each star
system begins producing value at its “mature” level immediately upon settlement.
Rationale: Accounting for ramp-up periods is unlikely to change our quanti-
tative results by more than 1–2 orders of magnitude, and so unlikely to affect our
qualitative conclusions.35
Simplification: The model ignores various physical/astrophysical considera-
tions that are significant on very long timescales: cosmic expansion, change in the
number/composition/energy output of stars, increasing entropy, proton decay...
Rationale: These considerations become (extremely) significant on very long
timescales, and hence for intra-longtermist comparisons, but (given other assump-
35We can conservatively account for this consideration by simply choosing a larger value of tl,
representing the time at which we embark on interstellar settlement plus the time it takes to get a
new settlement up and running. (Thanks to Tomi Francis for this point.) And as we saw in §4.2,
modest increases in tl make little difference to our quantitative or qualitative conclusions.
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tions of the model) they do not have a significant effect on the comparison between
longtermist and short-termist interventions.
Simplification: The eschatological bound tf is treated as a hard (i.e., instan-
taneous) cutoff.
Rationale: The details of physical eschatology become significant on very long
timescales, and hence for intra-longtermist comparisons, but (given other assump-
tions of the model) they do not have a significant effect on the comparison between
longtermist and short-termist interventions.
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